What is essential is what cannot be otherwise than it is. So according to Augustine's picture, every word must be a name, and every sentence must be a combination of names. Or: every (meaningll) word must be correlated with an object, and every sentence must be composite. These uses of "must7' produce statements that cannot be read as empirical generalizations. In this sense, Augustine's picture is not comparable to any 'theory of meaning'. Formulations of essence are the paradigms of the 'metaphysical uses' of words [ §116] .
But what does it mean to speak of a 'picture' of the essence of language? What is 'picture' supposed to contrast with?
o n e relevkt point might be that the picture ascribed to Augustine is not explicit in the citation. It is imputed to him on the basis of his description of how he learned t o speak. In this case, if Augustine had set out t o answer the question "What is the essence of language?", could we n o longer say that he
How can a picture be challenged as gave us a picture?
bein5 mistaken or wrond? HOW can
Another point might be t h a t Augustine's
it "take U S in"?
account is impressionistic. Almost certainly it does not report memories of actual speech-learning episodes in his childhood but rather reports his idea of how he must have learned to speak. The account is also highly schematic, devoid of significant detail. Does it follow that what is inferred from this account must be equally an impression of the essence of language?
Yet another point might be that 'picture' here suggests that Augustine's account is inaccurate or incorrect or incomplete, as it were a mere picture. This dyslogistic use of 'picture' is familiar from other contexts. We speak of somebody's picture of a sequence of momentous events in which he was a participant, contrast bne participant's picture with another's, and perhaps also contrast the pictures of all the participants with a description of what really happened. Is Wittgenstein preparing to give a correct description of the essence of language (not a picture at all!) to be contrasted with all other pictures of this essence? Does 'picture' here imply that he judges Augustine's picture to be incorrect? And if it is not incorrect, how can it "surround the working of language with a haze that makes clear vision impossible" [ §51?
On the other hand, Wittgenstein often seems to suggest that what he calls 'pictures' are not subject to assessment as being correct or incorrect. They might be superstitions, but they are not mistakes [ §110] . "The picture is there; I don't dispute its correctness" [ §424] . This is because there is nothing to dispute in this respect about a picture. H e continues: "What is in question is unclarity about how it is to be applied." An example would be misapplying the picture of inner-outer by taking something t o be hidden behind what is inner in the picture [LPE 2811 . Pictures are to be contrasted with applications of pictures [&$374,422-71. But if a picture cannot be correct or incorrect, then in a sense it cannot give any information, so it must, in a sense, be vacuous. And yet it can be misleading [VI.248] , damaging, constraining. How is this possible? A description might be misleading, for example, if it incorporates false information (how?) or implies (or even naturally suggests (to us)) ideas that are false (as 'objects' suggests logical independence t o us). But what if no information is conveyed? How can a picture be challenged as being mistaken or wrong?3 How can it "take us in" [PIp.184] ?
These questions are all-important. Uncertainty about how to construe 'picture' affects the overall interpretation of $$I-89 and arguably too the interpretation of the Private Language Argument [$$243-32 1 1. Is Wittgenstein's intention to demolish Augustine's picture? T o demonstrate that it is a misdescription of the essence of language? (Does he regard this picture as a botched attempt to describe the everyday use of such terms as 'language', 'meaning', 'word', 'sentence', and 'object'? ~e n c e as a minepresentation of these concepts?) Is his aim t o replace Augustine's picture with a correct description of the essence of language, that is, with an accurate description of the grammar of 'language' [compare $3721-and perhaps also of 'name', 'sentence', 'object', 'description', and so forth? Or does he propose, and try to win our acceptance of, a different picture of the essence of language? Could it be a picture that he means to present in the slogan: "The meaning of a word is its use in language-a sentence is an instrument in a language-game" [compare $$43, 421] ? What would be the implications of our calling this a 'picture'? Would it thereby lose all philosophical interest? O r any claim to our attention? Would it be a mere picture?
Provisional typology of remarks in the Philosophical lnvestigatlons 1 ) Formulations of rules of grammar; or descriptions of the grammar of certain words (whether these be our words in everyday use or symbols of an imaginary language-game). For example:
$2: The language of the builder and his assistant. $246: "I cannot be said to learn of my sensations. I have them. The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain but not to say it about myself. (Incidentally, this perhaps describes the grammar of our current language, but not of Descartes'!)" $199: "It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule." $248: "One plays patience by oneself." p. 222: "It is correct to say 'I know what you are thinking,' and wrong to say 'I know what I am thinking.' (A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar.)" 2) Extremely general facts of nature (see p. 56n), which are important for explaining the importance of certain concepts (see p. 230). Also propositions constituting our Weltbild ( C $$93-4,167). For example:
$142: The practice of selling things by weight would "lose its point if it frequently happened for (lumps of cheese) suddenly to grow or shrink for no obvious reason."
When I point to something, another generally looks in the direction in which I have pointed, not at my finger (as a cat does).
$199: "It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule."
The world has existed for a long time. [ C $ §85,182-8,233, 31 I would like to offer some very preliminary comments on this third kind of remark, that is, about a picture as it contrasts with the first two kinds of remarks:
A picture gives no information, hence no incorrect information. "Not facts; but as it were illustrated turns of speech" [ §295] . Perhaps it is more like a way of seeing things, a conception (Auffassunng) or a norm of representation. Its adoption may force us to give descriptions having a particular pattern, for example to describe all differences in word-use as differences in the objects signified by the words, or (as with Frege) to describe the inferential powers of judgments in terms of analysis into functions and arguments.
A picture may force itself upon us or persist unshakably as part of our thinking. "The picture forces itself on us" [$103] . It is very important that pictures d o force themselves on us [RFM42], or "intrude on us" [CV50]. They may captivate us [$112] . They may get a grip on our thinking, holding us in a cramped position or keeping us in thrall. In this way, some pictures resemble prejudices or superstitions. And they may seriously restrict intellectual freedom. They produce mental cramps.
A picture seems non-literal, metaphorical [LPE 2801, allegorical, figurative, and so forth (for example, of possibility as a shadow, or the outside/inside distinction like a drawer and its contents). Hence, apparently beyond criticism as 'nonsense'.
Changes in grammar alter sense (concepts), but changes in pictures do not.
For example, different pictures may be attached to our concept of possibility. It seems that we may replace one with another without altering the meaning of 'possible' . 5 Weltbild and pictures need not be evident or conscious; often they must be discovered by sensitive reflection on our own practice (hence, in a sense, by bringing t o consciousness what is unconscious). We may even resist acknowledging them, because they are revolting or too crude. (Whereas grammar can be regarded as being fixed by the explanations we give [compare $751-though perhaps not without some prompting?) The power of pictures (or prejudices) to distort thinking may largely depend on their being uncons~ious.~ Two clear points about pictures emerge: 1) Pictures are often to be contrasted with rules of grammar or everyday explanations of the meanings of words. (Nobody would explain 'possible' by calling possibility a shadowy reality. O r formulate Augustine's picture to explain how to make use of the expression 'a language'. Or propose 'inner' as a synonym for 'mental' or 'conscious'.)
2) Pictures are of the utmost importance for Wittgenstein's philosophy. "Grammatical problems are connected with the oldest Denkgewohnheiten, that is, with the oldest pictures embedded in our language" [V.224; BT 422-31. "Our investigation tried to remove this bias which forces us to think that the facts must conform to certain pictures embedded in our language" [BB 431.'
The main issue
THE BIG QUESTION IS: HOW DOES AUGUSTINE'S PICTURE FIT INTO THIS TRIPARTITE framework? Is it to be treated as a picture of meaning? Or as a misdescription of the grammar of 'meaning', 'word', 'sentence', and so forth? How does Wittgenstein see thls matter? (Which view makes best sense of his strategy of investigation? Which best epitomizes the content of § §l-1431)
A subsidiary goal here is to attain further clarification of the distinctions among these three kinds of remark and to show what is at stake in conhsing them with one another.
The use of resolving these matters will be to mark out the danger of crossing two different language-games in discussing Wittgenstein, that is, the danger of genre-misidentification. In particular, t o caution against attacking and defending pictures as if they were meant as (literal?) descriptions of grammar. (For example: arithmetical equations are rules of grammar; the mathematician is an inventor, not a discoverer; in a proof we win through to a decision.) Much secondary literature may be deeply flawed in this respect.
A similar danger is taking Wittgenstein to offer grammatical refutations of pictures. For example: "Every Satz must be composite'' [PLP 316-71, or "The real elements must be indestructible" [ §39], or "A proposition-sign must be a fact" [TLP 3.141 . Does Wittgenstein intend to canvas exceptions to such statements? To propose counterexamples?
The grammar of 'picture'
THIS SECTION ATTEMPTS A FIRST SKETCH OF THE USE OF 'PICTURE' (IN, AS IT WERE,
'Wittgenstein-Speak'), that is, an exploration of one of Wittgenstein's uses of the term. (I ignore here his discussions of painted pictures, portraits, and so forth.) These remarks seem to hold equally of his use of 'conceptions' (Auffassungen) and 'ways of seeing things'. 1 ) 'Picture' is quite naturally associated with facticity-disclaimers. Hence a picture might be called a 'conception' (Auffassung), 'way of seeing things', 'way of looking at or regarding things', or 'aspect'. And it might be marked with qualifiers, for example, "in a certain sense," "one might say," "I want to say." (Perhaps too with scare-quotes and italics.)
Wittgenstein emphasizes this point; he refrains from disputing the correctness of pictures [ §424] .
"The mind seems able to give a word meaning" [p. 1841. This is not something that seems to be so; it is a picture. Thus we see that a picture is not s u~e s t e d to us by experience [ §59] . (Though it may be drawn from familiar materials.) It is not gotten by induction, for example, the picture theory of the proposition [compare Z $4441.
This point about non-facticity seems independent of the particular content of a picture, especially ofwhether it is a picture of language or of the world.
Corollary: a picture cannot be contradicted by observations or discoveries. . In dissolving problems, "I must always point to an analogy according to which one had been thinking, but which one did not recognize as an analogy" [BT408].
How is this to be explained? A picture picks out certain things as selfexplanatory, others as problematic; it steers attention towards certain aspects of things and away from others; and it guides the direction that problem-solving takes and helm to set the standard of adesuacv for a solution. These matters are of the . , greatest importance. It seems to set up, as it were, a form of representation for the description of things. Even for the description of the g a m m a r of our language (compare $131 ). Nothing more? Rather, nothing less! Choice of a form of representation is answerable td no facts. but it is of decisive importance. It determines a whole intellectual orientation.
A picture may be both empty and perniciou+this seeming paradox is fundamental to Wittgenstein's conception of pictures, that is, to his metaphorical use of 'picture' with respect to conceptions or models. (In fact it is not a paradox at all: its emptiness makes the picture irrefutable and beyond the reach of attack and channels intellectual activity into the perverse activity of explaining away apparent counterexamples [ 
Corollary: we must surrender the desire to establish "the only possibility,"
"the nature of.. .," and so forth and the desire to confute philosophical adversaries.
(Perhaps a very difficult renunciation?). T o a considerable extent, Wittgenstein's philosophy involves negotiations with others (his readers and interlocutors, real or imaginary) about pictures, Auffassungen, conceptions. This is liable to go deeply against the grain of soi-disants analytic philosophers. They relish the clash of steel on steel, the adversarial model of argument, the possibility of proving something, especially the possibility of proving other philosophers to be wrong. They have a definite ideal of philosophical argument as case-building. Wittgenstein's admirers want to see him as participating in this activity: they want to extract results from his texts (for example, proof of the incoherence of speaking a private language), and they wish t o find in his work cogent justification of their own activity. In their view, swapping pictures or possible ways of seeing things would be useless and repugnant, perhaps to be condemned as a form of 'relativism'.
7)

A picture: 'Meaning is use'
GIVEN WITTGENSTEIN'S CARE IN DRAFTING REMARKS, AND GIVEN THIS MINIMAL
background to his use of 'picture' (his conception of a picture?), we should expect him to juxtapose against Augustine's picture of the essence of language another picture, not a compendium of grammatical rules for using 'meaning' or 'language' or an alternative 'theory'. We might set out to look for signs that his slogan, "The meaning of a word is its use in the language," is meant to be taken as a picture in his sense, that is, as a counter-picture to Augustine's picture.
This expectation seems t o be abundantly borne out. Evidence is everywhere in plain view in his texts. Wittgenstein's own discussion of meaning, explanation, language, and so forth is full of the qualifiers characteristic of pictures: "in our (my) sense," "for us," "for my purposes," and so forth. These seem to mark off his remarks as presenting an alternative conception rather than facts of the grammar of our language (standard English). Here is a sample of such remarks from the early 1930's: "For us, understanding is a correlate of explanation." "Meaning, in our sense, is embodied in explanations of meaning." "For our purposes, mental pictures can always be replaced by drawings or diagrams." "We are always comparin~ language with a game played according to strict rules." [PG 60, 63, 68, 69 and what 'judgingJ is." That is, it cannot be explained in this way, as "measuring length" can. More importantly: "For a large class of cases-though not for all-in which we employ the word meaning' it can be explained thus. the meaning of a word is its use in the language" [ §43] . This sounds as if it were meant to be definitive of the concept of meaning, not a picture of the essence of word-meaning. It seems to say something authoritative and final (even worryingly dogmatic?). It has the register of fact-stating discourse. So too does the remark: "The use of a word in the language is its meaning" [PG 601. Is there really inconsistency or tension here?
This implication might easily be resisted. Provided Wittgenstein thought that he had made it perfectly clear that his general intention was to offer a counterpicture to Augustine's picture, he might see no point in drafting every individual remark t o make this explicit. The whole discussion of @1-89 might be deemed to be subordinate to this qualification. Just as Montaigne said of Aristotle that his ideas are Pyrrhonism cloaked in assertion, so we might say of Wittgenstein that his criticism of Augustine's picture consists of a picture (Auffassung) cloaked in assertion. The issue is the spirit in which his remarks are to be read.
Augustine's picture is a widely accepted form of representation of the grammar of our language, of the meaning of words. (It is visible in Frege's search for the definitions of the natural numbers, or in Quine's concern with 'ontological commitments'.) Wittgenstein labors t o establish a different form of representation in the thinking of his readers. According to his alternative picture, the meaning of a word is its use in practice (compare the grocer in §I), its meaning is the correlate of everyday explanations of meaning [@69, 751, meaning is in the expression (not behind it) [DS 4-5; F* 181, speaking and thinking are operating with signs, and it is use that gives life to 'dead' signs [BB 41 . Just as Augustine's picture is not criticized by reference to 'linguistic facts', so this picture is cannot be justified by the claim that it describes them correctly. Wittgenstein does not claim that "meaning is what is explained by an explanation of meaning" is a true account of the concept of meaning (and the concept of explanation), but rather that this principle characterizes 'meaning in our sense' (or his conception of meaning). Similarly, he does not claim that 'think' and 'operate with signs' are synonymous (or have identical uses) but rather that this rough equivalence should be the center of variation for describing the complex use of the term 'think' [BB 61. The fact that he offers this ~bersicht of the grammar of 'think' while acknowledging discrepancies between the uses of 'think' and 'operate with signs' is a clear indication of his conception that pictures are not fact-stating. (This ~bersicht of 'think' is misunderstood when it is taken to formulate a rule of grammar.)
Both attacks on his philosophy of language and defenses of his conception neglect the crucial point that he is offering an interpretative pictztre. (This is what these disputes look like. One party attacks Wittgenstein's form of expression as if they were attacking a statement; the others defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being [compare $4021.) The same point holds in his philosophy of mathematics, for example, his calling arithmetical equations rules of grammar.
Augustlne's picture of language ANALYSIS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S DISCUSSION OF AUGUSTINE'S PICTURE PAYS TOO LITTLE attention to his treating it as a picture of the essence of language. His methods of investigation are thereby misrepresented. Both 'picture' and 'essence' are crucial for understanding the contours of his critical investigation.
Essence
AUGUSTINE'S PICTURE CONSISTS ENTIRELY OF NECESSARY TRUTHS: IT IS CONCERNED
with the essence of language. Hence it tells us nothing about the actual uses of any words. In particular, it does not state that all words in English or German have the same use, that there are no categorial (or combinatorial) differences among them, that all English or German sentences contain more than one word, or that all sentences are used in a single way. It cannot be demonstrated to be incorrect by producing counterexamples. That strategy fails to acknowledge the radical difference between a necessary truth and an empirical generalization. (Claims about essence are demands [Erforderungen] , not discoveries [Ergebnisse] .) Canvassing counterexamples also pays no attention to the distinction between appearance and reality: as in the Tractatw Logico-Philosophicus, apparent nonconformity may mask real (hidden) conformity.
Wittgenstein's own discussion pays scrupulous attention to this difference. Here is one clear example [paraphrase of PLP 317-81: An objection might be made to the thesis that any proposition must be composite (complex). Consider the sign "Restaurant" posted over the door into a building. This simple, one-word (noncomposite) sign is apparently sufficient to state that this building is a restaurant. Q.E.D.-But, it is replied, what signifies that this building is a restaurant is not the sign alone, but the fact that the sign is positioned over the door. This fact is itself composite, one of its elements being the spatial position occupied by the word "Restaurant.:"So, if we recognize that the propositional-sign must be the whole of what states that this is a restaurant, it is not a single word and it is manifestly composite. (This line of reasoning, derived from a dictation to Waismann [F* 381, could serve as a model of how cogently to rebut any putative counterexample to any of the essential truths of the Tractatus.)
How then can one criticize this component thesis in Augustine's picture? Wittgenstein's 'argument' (derived from a conversation with Sraffa) is to point out that we can use a gesture to make a statement (for example, the gesture of slitting the throat). Wittgenstein seems aware of, and critical of, a tendency among philosophers to disregard modal qualifications ('can3, 'cannot', 'may', 'need not', and so forth) and thereby t o assimilate essential truths t o empirical generalizations.
"Science has shown that ...." is a constant refrain, a recurrent form of criticism in modern philosophy. For example, Descartes held that there was no such thing as a thought of which the thinker is not conscious, to which is made the objection: but Freud has shown that there are unconscious states of mind. (Here is an &noratio facti with regard t o 'thought' and 'conscious'.) Wittgenstein suggests seeing 'unconscious toothache' (or 'unconscious desire') as a new convention, rather than seeing this as a 'stupendous discove ry... which in a sense bewilders our imagination' [BB 231 . H e suggests regarding many revolutions, even in science, as stipulations of new concepts rather than discovery of new facts. For example admitting action at a distance in mechanics (Newton versus Descartes) changes what it makes sense to say, or to offer as an e~planation.~ Wittgenstein himself constantly emphasizes the radical distinction between necessary and contingent propositions (especially in mathematics): he is very careful in his use of modal qualifications, and he respects them in the thinking and writing of others. In his view, it is a fundamental confusion to propose counterexamples to descriptions of essence.
Here, we might say, Wittgenstein emphasizes the distinction between descriptions of grammar and very general facts of nature, the importance of keeping these things distinct. He treats Augustine's picture as consisting of propositions about essence, not a schematic, quasi-scientific theory (or proto-theory) of meaning.
Picture
IMPRESSED BY THIS LAST POINT, ONE MIGHT ADOPT A NEW STRATEGY FOR DEALING with Augustine's picture, one that discounts the importance of the term "picture." (This strategy is widespread in interpreting Wittgenstein.) Since essence is expressed by grammar [$372], Augustine's 'account' of the essence of language must be taken to consist of descriptions of the use of the terms 'name', 'object', 'sentence', 'combination', 'word', and so forth. The essence of language is then 'given,' namely by the grammar of 'meaning', 'name', 'word7, 'sentence7, 'object', 'combination', and so forth.
It is then tempting to suppose that the use of these terms is relatively fixed or omnitemporal. They belong to the basic vocabulary of everyday discourse-a vocabulary whose application seems more or less invariant. (Compare BT424: there is no progress in philosophy because language always throws up the same problems.)
Combining these two ideas gives scope for trenchant criticism of Augustine's picture. That is, it gives an incorrect description of the (omnitemporal) grammar of 'meaning', 'name', and so forth. So it stands in need of replacement by the correct account.
This provides another pattern of interpreting Wittgenstein's discussion of Augustine's picture. Its theses are mistaken. Here is one remark that seems to fit this pattern: having noted that some philosophers call the word "this" the only genuine name, Wittgenstein observes that the kind of use the word "this" has is not among the many different kinds of use of a word that are labeled by the word "name" [ §38]. Hence t o call "this" and "that" names is t o misuse the term "name." It is, apparently, a 'metaphysical use' (because it is deviant from ordinary practice), and it is to be corrected by bringing the word "name" back to its everyday use [$116] . Similar remarks may be made about other features of Augustine7s picture. For example that it is incorrect to classify "Now I understand" or "I am in pain" as 'descriptions': the first is a signal [ §180], while the second is an expression or avowal (Ausserung) of pain, a learned replacement for pain-behavior [ §244]. Similarly, he seems to claim that it is incorrect to describe ostensive definitions as connecting language with reality; they in fact connect symbols with samples, which are themselves parts of language [ §51] . In this way, each of the component theses of Augustine's picture is demonstrated to be mistaken.
Correspondingly, Wittgenstein's positive conception of meaning (identifjing meaning with use) is taken to be the correct description of the concept of meaning (or the grammar of 'meaning'). For example, the slogan "Meaning is use" is itself a description of grammar: it is justified by the observation that the use of "the meaning of the word.. . . ." and the use of "the use of the word.. . ." run along parallel tracks. Wittgenstein is correct to state that ostensive definitions are substitutionrules for symbols (including gestures and samples) [BB 1091 , that it remains within language.1° However, neither the negative nor the positive sides of this account seems to correspond closely to what Wittgenstein actually says.
The negative case is not simply a clarification of the grammar of these metalinguistic concepts. The discussion does not terminate with identifying 'mistakes'. For example: $24a: "If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: 'What is a question?'." Wittgenstein proceeds to list some answers. The point is not that these are incorrect answers (based on the idea that answers t o questions are all descriptions) but that the question itself is pointless, t o be discarded as without interest (dissolved 38: N o t i n g that "this" is not what is called a name is not the end of Wittgenstein's discussion, but the beginning. H e seeks t o understand why it occurs t o one to want to make precisely this word into a name when it evidently is not a name [$39].11 The implication is that this particular application of Augustine's picture appeals to someone precisely because it involves a deviant use of the term "name." He is already aware of this deviant usage-so pointing it out to him achieves nothing! What needs to be counteracted is the urge to describe the use of "this" in this peculiar manner.
Wittgenstein treats Augustine's picture as if it lay beyond the reach of argument based on cataloguing facts about the grammar of meta-linguistic concepts. H e discusses this conception of the essence of language as something powerful, deeprooted and worthy of respect. And he treats it as being, in a certain sense, unassailable.
The counterpart, positive, idea that Wittgenstein's own discussion of the essence of language is intended to be a correct description of the grammar of 'meaning', 'name', and so forth is equally misconceived. (It too begins from the thesis that "Essence is described by grammar" is a description of the grammar of 'essence', not an insight or way of seeing things [HISP 331.) We have already noted the abundance of textual signals that what he offers is a picture or conception of language (of the meaning of words and the sense of sentences). Such as in $421: "Look a t the sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as its employment." (This is an optional point of view, not an ineluctable fact about the grammar of the phrase 'the sense of the sentence.. . .') Here, we might say: Wittgenstein emphasizes the distinction between descriptions of grammar and pictures of grammar, the importance of keeping these distinct. A picture is not subject to a reductio a d absurdurn-in even the loosest sense.
The point of having a clear conception of what Wittgenstein means by a picture is two-fold:
First, Augustine's picture is primarily a form of representation, a way of seeing things, an intellectual orientation. T o displace or replace it is a tremendous undertaking. Wittgenstein aims at nothing less than transforming an entrenched way of thinking, habits of thought (Denkgewohnheiten) that are evidently still dominant among analytic philosophers. This is much more ambitious and radical than correcting a misdescription of the uses of words. Part of what he aims to achieve is win acceptance of the principle that "Essence is expressed by grammar," that is, acceptance of a particular conception of essence.'" Secondly, appreciating that Augustine's picture is a picture is vital for acknowledging that Wittgenstein's own 'theory of meaning' is also meant to be a picture (conception, way of seeing things). Hence its acceptance (or rejection) is wholly voluntary. This has the implication that most of the discussions that try to refute or rebut Wittgenstein's 'theory,' as well as most of those that try to defend it against attack, are misconceived. There is literally nothing to attack-as being incorrect. And nothing to defend-as being an accurate description of the grammar of our language. T o engage in these controversies is already to take Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations in the wrong spirit.
Wittgenstein's positive aim is not to get you to say something you don't want to say, but to d o something you don't want to d o (compare LFM 55), namely to investigate meaning from a very different point of view. T o focus on use-as in $1; not on Satzbau (sentence-construction)-as in "logical geography." Soi-disants Wittgensteinians tend to miss this aspect of his philosophy.
